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STATES, SECURITY FUNCTION
AND THE NEW GLOBAL FORCES
T.V. PAUL
In this paper, I explore the impact of globalization on one of the
fundamental functions of nation-states—national security. Contrary
to the polar positions of the proponents and the opponents of glo-
balization, I argue that national security still remains a core function
of the nation-state, but the extent of security behavior varies
depending on the particular situations of states. Largely under the
influence of systemic changes propelled by the end of the Cold War,
rapid technological changes in both the civilian and military spheres,
and the resurgence of the American hegemonic power, the nature of
security competition has altered somewhat, but it is premature to
bury the nation-state or its role as the key provider of national security.
The paper critiques the contention that, because war created nation-
states, the end of warfare could result in citizens losing their identities
based on citizenship and their loyalties to the state. I argue that
geopolitical competition is unlikely to simply become an issue of the
past, even though increasingly other forms of competition—geo-
economic, geo-technological—may occur and these competitions
may sometimes compensate for active military rivalries for a period of
time. Systemic forces are still at work, and over time the rise of new
major powers and the decline of the present ones will affect the contours
of world politics and state behavior. The paper also briefly looks at
the United States and its role as the security provider in the new era.
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I argue that the US is unlikely to loosen its role as a national security
state. The United States will face both hard and soft challenges to its
security given its extant position as the hegemonic power, and because
of this, it is bound to be involved in limited conflicts with smaller
powers and large-scale competition with other great powers, especially
China and Russia. Although war in the great power system is unlike-
ly, war preparation is likely to be actively present in it because of the
fear that losing out in the technological revolution for new arms may
create opportunities and willingness for the great power that gains an
advantage in the competition. States, especially the major powers, will
choose allies and partners on the basis of congruence of interests in
the security sphere. The increasing unilateralism of the US and pres-
sures emanating from the desire of other key states for multipolarity
will result in the continuation of soft challenges, including tech-
nological competitions involving the US and other developed states,
especially those in Europe.
In the following pages, I explore the impact of globalization on
the state, especially the US, as the national security provider. I make
several inter-related arguments. First, globalization, despite its wide
sweep, is to a certain extent, although not exclusively, the “America-
nization” of economic, political and cultural ideas and practices.
Second, globalization by no means has ended power competition
among the major powers. Limited peace caused by the decline and
subsequent domination of one or another major power is not a pre-
cursor to lasting or perpetual peace. Efforts to convert hegemony into
empire are unlikely to succeed; while benign policies might produce
benign results, these may not last indefinitely. Third, the relative
gains problem does exist even when multiple global channels and
networks link countries. As long as nations gain economic benefits
fairly uniformly, competition is likely to remain limited, or even muted,
but once large-scale inequalities creep in, states that lose out may
resort to challenge by means other than exerting voice from within
or even ‘exit’ if they are capable of doing so. Fourth, hegemony by its
very nature creates counter-pressures on those who are most affected
by it. Those who can mobilize against the hegemon may well do so,
often through asymmetrical means and strategies. Attempts by the
hegemonic state to adjust to its decline may also produce challenge
and opposition. As long as the hegemonic state is in a dominant posi-
tion and it can offer collective goods to others, be they security or
market access, large-scale disturbances are unlikely to occur. However,
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in order for the hegemon to prolong its power position, it has to
innovate constantly and ward off potential threats from weaker actors.
Such innovation forces others to catch up through arms races or
asymmetric strategies that limit the extent of the hegemon’s innovative
edge. Continued dominance by a single actor creates insecurities for
subordinate states and these may manifest themselves in actions that
appear ‘rogue’, while the hegemon may make responses that are “hyper”
or are based on “technological fixes.”
Contending Views on Globalization and the State
Globalization enthusiasts have argued that “hard geopolitics” has
become obsolete, partly due to the lethality of new weapons and partly
because states are now more interested in wealth acquisition through
economic liberalization and trade.1 To them, war-making is no longer
the state’s primary focus, given the dramatic decline of inter-state
wars since the end of the Cold War in 1991. In the larger international
arena, great power competition is conducted through “soft geopolitics,”
with less emphasis on overt competition, arms buildup or crisis activity.2
1. Different versions of the globalization thesis exist in the literature. Extreme
proponents like Ohmae contend that under the irreversible influence of mod-
ern information technology, genuinely borderless economies are emerging,
affecting values and behavior of citizens around the world. Kenichi Ohmae,
The End of the Nation Sate, New York: Free Press, 1995:vii. More nuanced
versions of this theme are presented by James N. Rosenau, “New Dimensions
of Security: The Interaction of Globalizing and Localizing Dynamics,” Secu-
rity Dialogue, 25(3) 1994:255-81; Tony Spybey, Globalization and World
Society, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1996; Hans-Henrik Holm and George
Sorensen, Whose World Order? Uneven Globalization and the End of the Cold
War, Boulder: Westview Press, 1995; David Held et al. Global Transforma-
tions: Politics, Economics and Culture, Stanford: Stanford University Press,
1999.
2. Mann, although not a proponent himself, summarizes the position of the
globalists in this respect: “Post-nuclearism undermines state sovereignty and
‘hard geopolitics,’ since mass mobilization warfare underpinned much of mod-
ern state expansion yet it is now irrational.” Michael Mann, “Has Globaliza-
tion Ended the Rise and Rise of the Nation-state?” in T.V. Paul and John
A. Hall, eds. International Order and the Future of world Politics, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1999:238. Globalists in general believe that social
relations worldwide have increased with events happening in different loca-
tions affecting each other while the “locus of power gradually shifts in vary-
ing proportions above and below the territorial state.” James H. Mittelman,
The Globalization Syndrome: Transformation and Resistance, Princeton:
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To some, non-traditional issues such as terrorism, organized crime,
drug trafficking, ethnic conflicts, exploding population growth, envi-
ronmental degradation, and mass poverty have emerged as the key
security threats. Competing notions of ‘human security’ have begun
to make inroads into official thinking in various countries “suggesting
that security be viewed as emerging from the conditions of daily
life—food, shelter, employment, health, public safety—rather than
flowing downward from a country’s foreign relations and military
strength.”3 For instance, James Rosenau contends that the nation-
state has weakened as a result of global social forces. To him, in
political, social and economic realms, fragmentation has occurred and
as a result “the close links between territoriality and the state are
breaking down…. In the political realm… authority is simultaneously
being relocated upward toward supranational entities, sideward
toward transnational organizations and social movements, and down-
wards toward sub-national groups and communities…. These shifting
tendencies are diminishing the competence and effectiveness of states
and rendering their borders more porous and less meaningful.” The
salience of internal issues, in turn, has decreased the importance of
the state as the national security provider, whereas security has tradi-
tionally been the core function of the nation-state, endowing it with
legitimacy and societal power.4
From the perspective of globalists, nations cannot afford to engage
in large-scale warfare any longer, chiefly due to deepened economic
Princeton University Press, 2000:6; see also Anthony Giddens, The Conse-
quences of Modernity, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990:64.
3. Jessica Mathews, “Power Shift,” Foreign Affairs, 76(1), January/February
1997:51. Cha summarizes some of the changes that globalists have presen-
ted. First, “an inter-penetration of foreign and domestic issues such as that
national governments increasingly operate in spaces defined by the intersec-
tion of internal and external security. Second, globalization puts unprec-
edented bureaucratic innovation pressures on governments in their search for
security, and creates multilateralist pressures to cooperate with substate and
transnational partners rather than traditional allies. Third, globalization
makes the calculation of relative capabilities extremely complex and non-
linear. Finally, globalization compels contemplation of new modes of fighting
as well as renders accepted modes of strategic thinking and rational deter-
rence increasingly irrelevant.” Victor D. Cha, “Globalization and the Study
of International Security,” Journal of Peace Research, 37(3), 2000:391-403.




interdependence and multi-layered interactions among states and
among transnational actors such as business corporations. More and
more businesses are moving away from multinational to transnational
levels of operation, i.e., producing components in different countries
worldwide and assembling them in others. Such production methods
have made individual subsidiaries “practically unable to produce
anything if cut off from the rest of the company. In many developed
countries, businesses integrated transnationally now account for one-
third to one-half of the industry’s output.”5 War under these circum-
stances would mean high economic costs for all states concerned, and
therefore it is only rational for interdependent states to forgo armed
conflict as a mechanism to resolve interstate disputes.
Furthermore, as more and more countries choose democratic
governance, the argument goes, the liberalizing elites deliberately
undermine the power of their militaries and thereby decrease the role
of the national security elite and its concerns in state policies. As the
liberalizing elites seek foreign capital and investment as well as
regional free-trade arrangements, they need to cut defense spending,
reduce the size of the armed forces, and conclude regional cooperative
security arrangements.6 Such reductions are also necessary in order to
gain capital and investment from international financial institutions
and market access to powerful economies such as that of the United
States.7 Moreover, according to liberals, democracies rarely fight each
other, and the widespread democratization of countries has reduced
the propensity of states to use force against one another. Democracies
deliberately play down military threats since they are reassured by the
benign intentions of their democratic counterparts. There are both
5. Peter F. Drucker, “The Global Economy and the Nation-State,” Foreign
Affairs, 76(5), September-October 1997:170-71. Echoing these positions,
Zacher contends that states are “becoming increasingly enmeshed in a net-
work of interdependencies and regulatory/collaborative arrangements from
which exit is generally not a feasible option.” Mark W. Zacher, “The Decay-
ing Pillars of the Westphalian Temple: Implications for International Order
and Governance,” in James N. Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel, eds., Govern-
ance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1992:60.
6. Etel Solingen, Regional Orders at Century’s Dawn, Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1998:46.
7. The tension between the modern forces of globalization and the traditional
forces of territory, culture, and glory are captured in Thomas Friedman, The
Lexus and the Olive Tree, New York: Farrar Starus & Giroux, 1999.
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institutional-structural and normative reasons for the restraint that
democracies show towards one another. Democratic institutions
constrain states as they make it harder to respond militarily to other
democracies in times of crises. Democracies also externalize their
domestic political norms of tolerance and compromise in their
foreign relations.8
More importantly, some believe that as threats decrease, the
security function of the state declines and, as a result, the attachment
of citizens to their state declines as well. Nation-states, founded on
the principle of protection to the citizenry as its core function, have
trouble developing an alternative to war as a source of loyalty; which
is often shown as the ultimate willingness of the citizen to sacrifice
his/her life for the defense of the country.9 The decline in the tra-
ditional national security function of the state may also result in the
weakening of states as divisive forces within step up their struggle
over the basic principles of domestic order.10
However, the liberal and globalist views have not gone un-
challenged. Indeed, the proponents of neorealism have argued that
the security function of the state has increased and that the new
global forces that are supposedly undermining states and their func-
tions in the security arena are exaggerated. To them, with the end of
the Cold War, the glue that held the international system together,
the bipolar structure, has disintegrated and that this will eventually
force countries to seek autonomous military capabilities. It is only a
8. Michael Doyle, “Liberalism and World Politics,” American Political Science
Review, 80(4), December 1986:1151-69; Bruce Russett, Grasping the Demo-
cratic Peace, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993; Steve Chan, “In
Search of Democratic Peace: Problems and Promises, “Mershon International
Studies Review, 41:1997:59-85.
9. The strongest proponent of this viewpoint has been Lipschutz, who argues:
“Loyalty to the state has been replaced by loyalty to the self, and national
authority has been shouldered aside by self-interest. The world in the future
might not be 200 or 500 or even 1,000 (semi-) sovereign states co-existing
uneasily; it could well be one in which every individual is a state of her own,
a world of 10 billion stateless, living in a true State of Nature.” Ronnie D.
Lipschutz, After Authority: War, Peace, and Global Politics in the 21st Cen-
tury, Albany: State University of New York Press, 2000:5. A more modest
version of this argument can be seen in Michael C. Desch, “War and Strong
States, Peace and Weak States?” International Organization, 50(2), Spring
1996:237-68.




matter of time, in this view, when formerly dependent countries, such
as Japan and Germany, will seek greater international roles by acquir-
ing the military wherewithal, including nuclear weapons, commensur-
ate with their economic prowess.11 Some neo-classical realists also
argue that security competition does not change from age to age and
that “bad times return.” For instance, Colin Gray, paraphrasing
Clausewitz, argues that “war is a chameleon—able to adapt to new
circumstances effortlessly.”12
Contrary to these polar positions, I argue that as we begin the
21st century the picture in respect to the state’s security function is a
mixed one. Neither the optimism of the globalists nor the pessimism
of the proponents of military security-first approaches is fully warranted.
Similar predictions in the past of the demise of the nation state, as
well as the decline of the state’s security function—in the face of the
advent of nuclear weapons and growing economic interdependence—
have been short lived.13 Following brief episodes of inter-state
11. Waltz argues: “Economic competition is often as keen as military competi-
tion, and since nuclear weapons limit the use of force among great powers
at the strategic level, we may expect economic and technological competition
among them to become more intense…. For a country to choose not to
become a great power is a structural anomaly. For that reason the choice is
a difficult one to sustain. Sooner or later, usually sooner, the international
status of countries has risen in step with their material resources. Countries
with great power economies have become great powers, whether or not
reluctantly.” Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Emerging Structure of International
Politics,” International Security, 18(2), Fall 1993:66; Waltz, “Globalization
and American Power,” The National Interest, Spring 2000:46-56. See also
John J. Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the
Cold War,” International Security, 15(1), Summer 1990:5-56; and Christopher
Layne, “The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise,” Interna-
tional Security, 17(4), Spring 1993:5-51.
12. Gray adds: “War’s nature as organized violence for political goals survives
untouched by radical shifts in political forms, motives for conflict, or tech-
nology.” To Gray, no “endist transformational theory” is in sight to slay
strategic history. Colin Gray, “Clausewitz Rules, Ok? The Future is the Past-
with GPS,” Review of International Studies, 25, December 1999:169. See
also Gray, Modern Strategy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999:9-11,
362-64.
13. John H. Herz, “The Territorial State Revisited: Reflections on the Future of
the Nation State,” in James N. Rosenau, International Politics and Foreign
Policy: A Reader in Research and Theory, New York: The Free Press,
1969:76-77; See also Herz, “Rise and Demise of the Territorial State,”
World Politics, 9, 1957:473; Klaus Knorr, On the Uses of Military Power in
the Nuclear Age, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966; Robert O.
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cooperation, states bounced back as national security actors as the
empirical reality of their independent role in security and security
competition began to set in. Yet the manner in which states conduct
military competition and war has changed in our times, a point that
neo-realists and neo-classical realists fail to adequately take into
account. Especially noteworthy in this connection is the virtual absence
of warfare among the major powers and among the established
democracies. Noticeable changes are also visible in the functions,
attitudes and threat assessments of the militaries across the world.14
My argument is that variations exist in the realm of security and
state responses to challenges posed by globalization, but they are
uneven and not so profound as globalists argue, and not so trivial as
realists characterize them. I contend that in order to explain the
variations we need to look at the political, economic and security
contexts of different states. These contexts cut across both domestic
and international levels. To a great extent, the distribution of power
determines systemic and sub-systemic level variations while domestic
level factors revolve around state strength and the political characteristics
of the states concerned. Variations also exist in the behavior of middle
and small powers that have great power protection or whose regions
have developed institutions to manage or contain inter-state conflict.
The argument is that great power conflict has subsided since the
end of the Cold War, but the system leaders are conducting their
competition through technological innovations in armaments, of both
offensive and defensive varieties, and creation of new balance of
Keohane and Joseph S. Nye Jr., “Power and Interdependence Revisited,”
International Organization, 41(4), Autumn 1987:727.
14. Moskos calls the new situation a “post-modern military paradigm.” Accord-
ing to him, the new paradigm consists of several variables and they are most
relevant in the US case. For instance, the primary perceived threat during the
Cold War was nuclear war, which has now changed to subnational conflicts.
The force structure was a large professional army, which is now a small
professional army. The major mission was to support alliance partners
whereas the new missions include peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance.
The public attitude towards the military used to be ambivalence, which now
has become indifference. Other changes are visible in the areas of media
relations, and the role of civilian employees, women, spouses, homosexuals
and the possibility for conscientious objection. Charles C. Moskos, “Toward
a Post-modern Military: the United States as a Paradigm,” in Moskos, John
Allen Williams and David R. Segal, eds., The Postmodern Military: Armed
Forces after the Cold War, New York: Oxford University Press, 200:15.
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power alignments. The great power system has not witnessed any
dramatic decrease in military spending (barring that of Russia) despite
the cuts in the early 1990s. The US, Russia and China have been
engaging in new forms of arms races, this time focusing more on
information warfare and “usable” mini nuclear weapons. Further, they
have acted in unison to prevent the rise of new nuclear states and
additional states acquiring delivery systems such as ballistic missiles,
fearing that such diffusion of capabilities would undermine their
dominance in the international system. Moreover, the “end of history”
is not in sight with respect to a fundamental characteristic of the modern
international system, i.e., power transitions resulting from the rise
and fall of great powers. In fact, the international system is notorious
for its lack of non-violent mechanisms to integrate rising economic
and military powers or provide them with leadership roles without
conflict.15
On a global scale, there has been no substantial relinquishing of
armed forces by states despite the fact that some states have scaled
down the size of their armed forces. Only two small states, Haiti and
Panama, have abandoned their armed forces and adopted the Costa
Rica model. Moreover, many trading states in the world are big spenders
on defense, belying the argument that the national security state has
all but vanished in the face of the forces of globalization and eco-
nomic liberalization.16 Furthermore, the contention that the increas-
ing transactions among non-state actors and their assumption of the
means of violence have fundamentally reduced the state’s monopoly
over force is not accurate. Historically, non-state actors played significant
roles along with states. As Bull contends, in eighteenth and nineteenth
century Europe also states co-existed and shared the stage with
chartered companies, revolutionary and counter-revolutionary political
parties, and national liberation movements.17
15. On this, see Kalevi J. Holsti, Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and Interna-
tional Order 1648-1989: Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991:339;
Ronald L. Tammen et al., Power Transitions: Strategies for the 21st century,
New York: Chatham House, 2000.
16. The 25 big defense spending nations include several trading as well as West-
ern liberal states. The US defense expenditure of $305.4 billion is higher than
the spending of all other 24 states combined. For these statistics, see Fact
Sheet, Washington D.C.: Center for Defense Information, February 7, 2000.
17. Hedley Bull, “The State’s Positive Role in World Affairs,” Daedalus, 108(4),
Fall 1979:112.
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It is, however, wrong to argue that no change has occurred in the
realm of the state’s security functions as we enter the 21st century.
Despite bleak predictions by neo-realists and neo-classical realists,
there is no strong evidence to suggest that, now that the Cold War
is over, countries are rushing to acquire arms or adopt offensive military
postures. In fact, during 1989-1998, world military expenditures
declined by one-third (to $745 billion in 1998) on an average of 4.5
per cent per year. However, this decrease has slowed down since 1998.18
Some nuclear or nuclear-threshold states, such as South Africa,
Argentina, Brazil, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus gave up their nuclear
programs and aspirations, while several other technologically capable
states are maintaining their non-nuclear policies.19 Especially impor-
tant is the fact that Germany and Japan, two potential great powers,
are maintaining their non-nuclear commitments. India and Pakistan,
two states that declared themselves nuclear in 1998, already had their
weapons developed in the 1980s while Israel, the third undeclared
nuclear state, had developed its nuclear weapons capability in the
1970s; the programs of aspirants such as Iraq, Iran, and North Korea
predate the end of the Cold War.
Changes have also occurred in the nature of warfare as a result of
the increasing salience of internal wars over inter-state warfare. Mili-
taries, especially in the developed world, are increasingly focusing on
the need to reduce casualties, especially of their own fighting forces
and the enemy’s civilian population. Because military actions in civil
wars are more protective or peacekeeping in nature, there is all the
more reason to focus on reducing casualties. However, this new style
of warfare has not reduced the collateral effects on civilian populations
in terms of “displacement, deprivation through sanctions, exposure
and famine.”20 Moreover, the US and its allies have been increasingly
using economic sanctions as a tool to achieve objectives that they
18. The decrease was most prominently manifest in Central and Eastern Europe,
especially Russia and this was due to continued economic constraints expe-
rienced by these sates. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI
Year Book, 1998. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999:269-70.
19. T.V. Paul, Power versus Prudence: Why Nations Forgo Nuclear Weapons, Mont-
real and Kingston: McGill-Queens’ University Press, 2000.
20. John Leech, “War without Death: The Silent Strategies,” Strategic Review,
28(2), Spring 2000:19-27, 20.
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have failed to obtain through war.21 These sanctions, in instances like
Iraq, have had somewhat similar effects of slow carpet bombings, in
terms of their devastating impact on the target state’s economy and
well-being of the population.
The responses of states to global social changes have not been
uniform throughout the world. In some regions, states continue to
pay more attention to the traditional national security function than
in others. Despite incremental changes in regions like Latin America,
the security function of states has not significantly declined in regions
such as East and South Asia, Africa, the Persian Gulf and the Middle
East. In fact, in some of these regions, the security function has
increased even among economically liberalizing states (e.g., India)
and among those that have made regional security arrangements
(e.g., Indonesia), especially in the area of domestic security. Although
the European Union has made defense cuts in the wake of the
collapse of the Warsaw Pact, the key European states, UK, France and
Germany, are in the process of strengthening their security ties through
other means, such as the creation of the European Security and Defense
Identity (ESDI). These states, after participating in the US-led
military operations in Kosovo in 1999, have concluded that they need
to develop more autonomous defense capabilities in order to decrease
their over-dependence on the United States. Some EU members also
harbor an interest in the creation of a version of a United States of
Europe, and autonomous security behavior and capability are viewed
as reinforcing that potentially unified entity. In East Asia, while China
has increased defense spending, Taiwan has been on a weapons-
buying spree, and both the Koreas have increased their spending on
defense. Japan, despite its four decades of a non-military focus, has
changed course somewhat, with spending increases, participation in
overseas peacekeeping operations, redefining SDF functions and, of
late, it has given indications that it may amend Article 9 of the
Constitution which forbids the militarization of Japan.22 However, it
21. On the value of sanctions as a tool of statecraft, see Jean-Marc F. Blanchard
and Norrin M. Ripsman, “Asking the Right Question: When do Economic
Sanctions Work Best?” Security Studies, 9(1/2), Autumn 1999-Winter
2000:219-53.
22. According to one analysis, with a defense budget of $35 billion, “Japan’s
defense spending exceeds that of both Russia and China. Tokyo has the
second largest navy in Asia—behind the United States—a substantial stand-
ing army, and its technology is second to few. The military option is Japan’s
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has also strengthened alliance ties with the US, thereby ensuring that
Tokyo’s pursuit of security is not unilateral.
What explains the variations in state responses in the area of
security in the face of changing global forces? Can we locate key
explanations by focusing on international and regional level factors or
domestic level political and economic forces? The international level
factors include the end of the Cold War, changes in balance of power
politics involving major powers, and technological revolutions that
are occurring in the instruments of warfare. At the domestic level,
does the continuing hold of the military in power and the “holy cow”
nature of national security (or what Tilly calls the protection racket)
have something to do with the continuation of security focus of
states?23 The answer to these questions lies in the specific situations
of the state, as the influence of such factors varies across different
states with different contexts.
The situations of the different states can be illustrated by placing
them in the following broad categories. The particular context of a
state, arising from systemic and sub-systemic factors, has a great to do
in explaining their national security behavior in the Post-Cold War
era.
1. Major powers: Under this broad category, we need to look at
the United States as the status quo power, Russia as the declining
power, and China as the rising power. These states, despite holding
leadership positions in global and regional institutions, are the least
constrained by the norms of state behavior that downgrade national
security. Global social and economic forces have made only a limited
for the taking, should it choose.” “Asia’s Future Centers on China and
Japan’s,” Stratfor.com, Global Intelligence Update, December 22, 1999.
23. Tilly has argued that states often manufacture threats to pursue the security
function. He states: “governments’ provision for protection, by this standard,
often qualifies as racketeering. To the extent that the threats against which
a given government protects its citizens are imaginary or are consequences of
its own activities, the government has organized a protection racket. Since
governments themselves commonly simulate, stimulate, or even fabricate
threats of external war and since the repressive and extractive activities of
governments often constitute the largest current threats to the livelihoods of
their own citizens, many governments operate in essentially the same way as
racketeers.” Charles Tilly, “Warmaking and State Making as Organized
Crime,” in Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol, eds.,




dent in the primacy they accord to the national security state. Despite
the apparent lack of overt hostility, the major powers are engaged in
continuing competition over arms innovation, technology and
spheres of influence.
The major powers are by definition national security states, they
are prone to engage in military behavior/competition beyond their
regions that gives them leadership roles internationally. They tend to
possess global power projection capabilities, and are in the forefront
of technological innovations that would facilitate the creation of such
forces. Major powers acquire military capabilities not only for security
reasons, i.e., defense of the homeland and allies, but also for purposes
such as maintaining structural, compellent, and deterrent power
against other great powers and smaller adversaries, in whose affairs
they wish to intervene. Among the major powers, security behavior
varies depending on whether they are status quo, declining, or rising
powers. In the post-Cold War international system, the United States
has emerged as the status quo power, Russia as the declining power,
and China as the rising power in terms of their overall power attributes
and dispositions. These structural situations have affected their
approach towards security and the acquisition and maintenance of
military power capabilities.
2. States that are heavily involved in regional organizations:
Members of the European Union, which have already established a
pluralistic security community, are one example. Others include
ASEAN and Mercosur member states that have been forming nascent
security communities. The states in these regions have entered or are
entering into security interdependent relationships and have helped
to avoid warfare among themselves for several decades. These states
attempt to minimize the possibility of security competition while
devising benign strategies vis-a-vis one another. Their military plan-
ning and preparations are largely based on most-probable threat assess-
ments as opposed to worst-case assumptions. The protection provid-
ed by the United States has helped many of these states, especially in
Europe, to pay less attention to national security. This aspect, however,
could change over time, especially if the US reduces its commitment
to Europe.
3. Regional states, which are engaged in enduring rivalries with
one another and with the great powers: There are two types of states
in this category. First are states under some security protection of the
US (e.g., South Korea, Taiwan and Israel) and the second category
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consists of those states that enjoy no credible security protection from
outside and are often targets of economic or military sanctions by the
United States. India, Pakistan, North Korea, Iran, Iraq, and Syria are
prime examples of the latter category of states. Some of these states
seek regional hegemony and some face great power intervention in
their internal affairs. These states live in regional environments character-
ized by protracted conflicts and enduring rivalries. By definition, pro-
tracted conflicts are long-standing and are driven by intractable issues
such as territory, ideology or identity, and conflict relationships among
protagonists spill over into most spheres of inter-state interactions.
They are also the targets of arms merchants as they often buy advanced
weaponry. These states may be weak in terms of their capacity to
influence their societies as they hold minimum “infrastructural power,”
although they may have strong “despotic power” in terms of the
strength of their armed forces in their regional environments. They
are thus strong in some attributes of state capacity, but weak in others
relating to societal capacity. Their military planning and preparations
are based on worst-case assumptions as opposed to most-probable
threat assessments.
4. Very weak and failed states: Mostly in Africa, these states have
failed to create state structures sufficient to provide security or economic
protection to their citizens. Many such states are beset with problems
of internal conflict driven by ethnic rivalries and political and economic
inefficiencies. The state institutions often lack legitimacy and state
laws receive little compliance from citizens. The capacity of states to
protect citizens from predators is also minimal. However, overtime
some such states have created military institutions and have increased
their external conflict behavior. African states such as Congo, Nigeria
and Uganda fall under this category.
Category 1 and 3 states are the most concerned about the current
and future revolutions in military affairs (RMAs), especially develop-
ments in information warfare and national defense and theater
defense systems. Their concerns, however, vary depending on whether
they are allies or adversaries of the leading global power, the United
States.
The remaining section of the paper will largely discuss the responses
of the United States in the security arena in reaction to the forces of
globalization. In that context, the positions of Russia, China and some
key smaller challengers to the US hegemony will also be discussed.
The US case is important, as globalization is heavily shaped and
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influenced by the US through its policies in international institutions
and US-based multinational corporations that are the engines of much
of globalized economic activity. Globalization, if indeed a force that
affects all states, should have had its most powerful impact on the US
national security behavior. The effect seems perverse or limited on US
security policy. It is, therefore, imperative to explain why the US is
behaving in the security arena the way it does.
Responses by the United States
Of all the states in today’s international system, the US is probably
the major beneficiary of economic globalization, as American-based
multinational corporations have been its main engine. The United
States is the winner of the Cold War, and there is a sense in many
quarters of the US establishment of the arrival of the unipolar moment.
The new global social forces that globalists talk about should have
had significant impact on this state. Yet, the US has been most pro-
minent in the development of information warfare and missile-based
defense systems. Its defense budget of nearly $300 billion is almost
40 per cent of the world’s total military expenditures and higher than
the combined budgets of the other 24 leading defense spenders, includ-
ing Russia, China and Japan. The national security function of the
American state has shown no substantial decline from the Cold War
days.24 The reasons that have been presented for this phenomenon
relate to both the international and domestic levels.
For instance, Donald Snow argues that the culprit lies in
domestic level factors. To him, the chief reason for the high defense
spending are “the inherent conservatism of military planners and
practitioners” whose planning is based on worst-case assumptions;
“the intellectual and physical attachment to the Cold War,” especially
with respect to the vested interests developed as a result of the “vir-
tually stationary adversary”; and the “lack of urgency in making
24. This does not mean that the overall size of the US armed forces has not been
reduced from the Cold War days. In fact, it has shrunk by 40 per cent or so
from the Cold War peak in the 1980s. However, the military spending has
not been reduced to the levels before the Reagan-era buildup. The US still
spends over 80 percent of the military spending of the 1980s. This is poised
to increase in the coming decades. Ann R. Markusen and Sean S. Costigan,
“The Military Industrial Challenge,” in Markusen and Costigan, eds., Arming
the Future: A Defense Industry for the 21st Century, New York: Council on
Foreign Relations Press, 1999:12.
20 E
STATES, SECURITY FUNCTION AND THE NEW GLOBAL FORCES
military adjustments.”25 The domestic imperatives for high defense
maintenance are also often attributed to partisan politics at both pre-
sidential and congressional levels. But do these domestic factors
exclusively account for the persistence of high US spending?
I argue that domestic factors are important as proximate factors
but that they arise from a larger systemic and structural context. The
domestic consensus on military spending and technological innovation
is the result of deeply embedded geopolitical factors and challenges
to American hegemony that the US elite perceives from its vantage
point. Although the US is not involved in any major military conflicts
at the dawn of the 21st century, the very fact that it is the global
hegemonic power puts tremendous pressure on the American elite to
maintain strong armed forces in the decades to come. Even though
the “demands of war” have declined, the “demands for peace,” as
perceived by the elite, require high level of military preparedness. The
bottom line is that the US elite wants to prolong the American
hegemony as long as it can. The unprecedented economic prosperity
of the 1990s has occurred in the backdrop of no serious armed conflict
involving the major powers. The US consensus is not to allow any
large or small power or combination of powers to challenge its
dominance and, in order to do that, it ought to maintain its edge
over others in military technology and the preparedness of its armed
forces.26
25. Donald M. Snow, The Shape of the Future, 3rd Edition, Armonk: NY: M.E.
Sharpe, 1999:96-97. According to Grieder, the American society is yet to
come to terms with the end of the Cold War. The Cold War “provided a
central purpose to the society,” and “institutions of every kind accepted and
adapted to the imperatives of the Cold War struggle…. The process has
resembled a sophisticated form of log-rolling mutual trading and back-
scratching among states and companies and service branches…. The various
political alliances refuse to give up on any of the military-industrial plans for
the next round of fighter planes, ships, and missiles, despite the weakening
rationale for them.” William Greider, Fortress America: The American Mili-
tary and the Consequences of Peace, New York: Public Affairs, 1998:xiv-xvii.
26. The US strategic planning under the Clinton Administration has increasingly
focused on a “preventive defense” strategy. According to proponents of the
preventive defense approach, there are three types of national security threats
to the US. The A-list threats are against the very survival of the state such
as the Soviet threat during the Cold War. B-list threats—e.g. conflict in the
Persian Gulf—are vital to US interests, but not for the survival of the coun-
try, while C-list threats are those threats that indirectly affect US security but
not directly threaten US interests (e.g. Bosnia). Preventive defense is a com-
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The American hegemony is built around both military and
economic power, but often globalists ignore the military dimensions
of American power. This is partly because military power stays in the
background and it is often hard to pinpoint its impact on economic,
political and social forces.27 The US navy and overseas-based forces
continue to provide extended deterrent to allies and mount threats of
intervention against smaller regional adversaries and rising powers,
such as China. It controls the waters of all the strategically vital oceans
and thus helps to keep the trade routes in the oceans open for ship-
ping. Allies who would contribute men and money to its military
efforts, if called for, also strengthen its support base overseas. The US
has also relied on regionalism and regional arrangements for both
economic and political/strategic purposes.28 Much of the global eco-
nomic interactions among the Western states and their allies is occur-
ring in the backdrop of this order built around American power, be
it in Europe, East Asia, the Middle East, Persian Gulf or Latin America.
The United States has been the chief beneficiary of the post-
World War II international order, and in the post-Cold War era it has
strengthened its primacy in both economic and military terms. The
American decision-making elite, knowing that the unipolar moment
is a passing phase, is attempting to establish and reinforce the rules
of the game by creating and supporting a set of international
prehensive strategy which draws from political, military and economic instru-
ments with the aim of preventing B and C lists threats that have the potential
to grow into the A-list category, i.e. the survival of the United States, in the
next century. Ashton B. Carter and William J. Perry, Preventive Defense: A
New Security Strategy for America, Washington D.C. Brookings Institution
Press, 1999:14-18.
27. As Friedman puts it, global stability is sustained largely by the “presence of
American power and the American willingness to use that power against those
who would threaten the system of globalization…. The hidden hand of the
market will never work without a hidden fist.” The Lexus and the Olive Tree.
According to some, the US has more or less succeeded in achieving the three
objectives that it had laid out in the early 1990s: i.e., maintain the post- Cold
War global balance of power, ensure American technological and military
superiority, and create an economic climate favorable to its own interests.
Thus, the United States has not withdrawn from global balance of power “in
the free market utopia. On the contrary, US hegemony and sovereignty have
been strengthened in spectacular fashion.” Noelle Burgi and Philip S. Golub,
“Has Globalization Really Made Nations Redundant?” Le Monde Diplo-
matique, April 2000.
28. Mittelman, The Globalization Syndrome, 131.
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institutions, regimes and norms that would guarantee the non-arrival
of a challenger in the foreseeable future. It sees (rather exaggeratedly)
the spread of NBC (nuclear, biological and chemical) weapons and
their delivery systems to dissatisfied regional states as undermining
US hegemony and its capacity to intervene in the affairs of the
regional states. These capabilities in the hands of minor actors could
act as ‘great equalizers’ under certain circumstances. However, if proper
counter-measures are taken, which include balancing and band-
wagoning of regional states and the creation of prohibitory regimes
and norms, the US believes it can remain the dominant actor in the
international system for decades to come. Sanctions and technology
denials are other means to keep recalcitrant states in their place and
they are cheaper alternatives to war although their impact could be
quite devastating on a target state (e.g., Iraq since 1991 and Serbia
since 1994).
The favorable developments associated with RMAs are especially
critical to the US perceptions of continuation of its hegemony. These
revolutions are occurring in the spheres of information warfare, elect-
ronic warfare, precision guidance, remote guidance and control, and
improvements in munitions, target identifications, and command,
control and communication.29 The US defense planners have discuss-
ed the challenges and opportunities posed by RMA technologies. For
instance, the Joint Vision 2010 Report, prepared by former Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff John Shalikashvili and the 1997 Qua-
drennial Defense Review, prepared under Defense Secretary William
Cohen, have called upon the US military to achieve “dominant
battlefield knowledge,” “full dimensional protection,” “dominant
maneuver,” and “precision-strike ability for long-distance” in the first
decade of the 21st century. They called for the US to gain superiority
in information technologies in areas of computers and electronic
robotics, advanced munitions, ultra modern sensors, lighter, fuel
efficient and stealth vehicles, ships and rockets, allowing rapid deploy-
ment capabilities, and space-based weapons and directed energy
29. Lawrence Freedman, “The Revolution in Strategic Affairs,” Adelphi Paper,
318, London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1998:21; Colin S.
Gray, “Nuclear Weapons and the Revolution in Military Affairs,” in T.V.
Paul, Richard Harknett and James Wirtz, eds., The Absolute Weapon Revisited:
Nuclear Arms and the Emerging International Order, Ann Arbor: The Uni-
versity of Michigan Press, 1998:99-134.
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beams.30 The successful RMA applications will enable the US com-
manders to lift the “fog of war.” These are most visible in terms of
traditional functions such as intelligence gathering, surveillance, battle-
field reconnaissance, and transfer of data and their expeditious com-
munications to subordinates and the use of precision force with maxi-
mum accuracy and devastating effect. As Admiral Owens states it:
“together, these create the three conditions for combat victory:
dominant battle-space knowledge, near perfect mission assignments
and immediate/complete battle-space assessment.”31
At the systemic level, the declining great power, Russia, and the
rising great power, China, challenge the US primacy. However, their
challenge is no longer the high level zero-sum and frontal military
threats that existed during the Cold War era. Further, a group of
regional powers often branded as ‘rogue states’ has emerged as chal-
lengers to the US-led order, especially in the area of weapons of mass
destruction. Soft challenges are prevalent even among allies such as
Germany and Canada, especially on questions of nuclear first use and
the expansion of NATO. The US seems especially worried that
weaker powers would mount “asymmetric challenges” through new
tactics and strategies, and by obtaining weapons of mass destruction
and long-range delivery systems, including ballistic missiles. Even in
the area of RMA technologies, it fears that weaker adversaries could
adopt counter-measures in order to “exploit the US military’s
dependence on large bases, ships and other vulnerable assets, when
projecting power overseas, as well as Americans’ aversion to suffering
casualties.”32 Further, the US suspects that anti-US coalitions may be
developing among Russia and China and weaker states with the
intention of, at best, extracting concessions from the West.
The US economic dominance is another factor that drives its
security behavior. As nations become relatively wealthier in comparison
with others, they, just as individuals, wish to keep their prosperity
secure from encroachments by external actors, especially if that wealth
30. Michael O’Hanlon, Technological Change and the Future of Warfare, Wash-
ington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000:2-3.
31. Admiral Bill Owens, Lifting the Fog of War, New York: Farrar Straus Giroux,
2000:99-100.
32. O’Hanlon, Technological Change, 2-3. The interesting historical parallel is
the Roman Empire whose hegemony was challenged and eventually ended by
smaller actors. Michael Mann, The Sources of Social Power, Vol. I, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1986:298.
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is a function of the hegemony arising from dominance in military,
technological and normative dimensions. The dominance also results
from the fact that the hegemon provides security to allies who in turn
support the hegemon’s key economic and security goals.
Domestically, the main source of lack of policy change has been
the partisan pork-barrel politics and “holy cow” nature of national
security among the contending parties. This is clear from debates
among the two presidential candidates in the 2000 elections. Both
George Bush and Albert Gore want to increase defense spending in
order to ward off the threats arising from the so-called “rouge states”
and dissatisfied great powers, China and Russia. They advocate increased
spending on national missile defense (NMD) and theater missile
defense (TMD) systems even when it is clear to many defense analysts
and scientists that such systems are neither cost-effective nor fool-
proof. But these competing positions come out of a systemic context
that the American political elite is attempting to grapple with.
The national security function of the American state has not
declined substantially and it is unlikely to decline as long as Wash-
ington wishes to remain the global hegemon and as long as its eco-
nomic and security interests span across the world. The competition
for new and better weapon systems and higher allocation for develop-
ing cutting-edge technologies are also functions of the US desire to
reduce casualties in war and obtain its political and military goals
expeditiously if war occurs. Edward Luttwak terms this imperative as
arising from “post-heroic warfare,” which according to him has
replaced the grand style of wars fought for Napoleanic-type majestic
military visions.33 This is the most prominent change in the way the
security business is conducted. Democracy, mass media, and technology
all contributed to the demand for weaponry that would minimize, if
not eliminate, casualties.
The continued economic prosperity due to globalization is likely
to put pressure on augmenting the US military strength. Globalization
is a source of insecurity for the United States, as potential challengers
gain technology and wealth generated by the spreading global econo-
mic forces. Improvements in the defense realm by potential adversaries
such as China would demand further building up of the American
military. An appreciation of the challenges that the hegemonic state




faces requires a look at the main sources, i.e., other major powers,
both declining and rising.
Great Power Challenges to American Hegemony
The key challenges to American hegemony are likely to come from
China and Russia and anti-status quo states/actors in the developing
world. The challenge that Russia poses to US hegemony has declined
since the days of the Cold War, yet it still remains the most potent
power that can decimate the US in a nuclear attack. This Russian
capability itself provides the US the incentive to modernize and
establish technological superiority in weaponry. The foreign and
domestic policies of Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin have been
largely failures and as a result Russia has emerged as a weak state in
“infrastructural power” and somewhat in terms of “despotic power.”
Some call it a “messy state.”34 Yet, Yeltsin’s successor, Vladimir Putin,
has resurrected security as a plank on which to gain popular support
and to build strength as a great power nation. Putin’s brutal war in
Chechnya and his regime’s new military doctrine—which gives consi-
derable prominence to nuclear first-use—indicate the revival of a
national security state, despite daunting economic and political cons-
traints in doing so. Renewal of nationalism, increased reliance on
nuclear strike force, and a strategic alliance with China are central to
Putin’s plans for increased international standing, while limited
accommodations with the West could be pursued through arms con-
trol measures in order to buy time and breathing space.35
International factors are critical here as well. Two developments
involving NATO have shaken the Russian sense of security and are
likely to propel it to take a hard-line national security policy. These
are the expansion of NATO into Eastern Europe and NATO’s bombing
of Serbia in support of the Kosovar Albanians. The NATO expansion
has helped to remove the East European buffer that Russia has
34. Thomas L. Friedman, “The Messy State,” Montreal: The Gazette, October 4,
2000:B3.
35. Thanks to Putin’s influence, the Russian Duma in April 2000 ratified START
II and the CTBT as part of Russia’s dual track policy to be conciliatory in
arms control so as to gain diplomatic leverage with the US and Europe.
However, he has also increased efforts to build next generation nuclear weap-
ons. The Russian effort is to forestall US deployment of NMD and TMD so
as to avoid building expensive systems to counter the missile shield. “The
Opening Moves in Putin’s Game of Chess,” Stratfor.com, 24 April 2000.
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enjoyed since World War II.36 Russia’s security concerns also arise
from the competition over resources in East and Central Asia.37 Yet,
Russia’s security can no longer be viewed in geopolitical terms alone.
Economic and human security issues, migration of people, ethnic
conflicts, threats to uninterrupted energy supply, environmental degra-
dation, organized crime, terrorism, and nuclear smuggling are some
non-traditional security challenges Russia continues to face.38 In the
near-term these challenges will absorb much of Russia’s attention,
but looming challenges at the systemic level would also remain fund-
amentally important for this state. And it is unlikely that it will simply
stay in the backwaters of international politics.
The Chinese Challenge to US Dominance
China has emerged as the test case of how a national security state
and globalized economic power can go hand in hand. In fact, China
has simultaneously adopted both a trading state strategy and a high-
pitched national security state strategy aimed at making it a leading
global power of the 21st century. One of the key aims of China to pursue
a trading state strategy has been to enhance its power and status in
the international system as a major power. Thus, Chinese foreign and
security policies in this era of new global social forces are largely driven
by traditional realist concerns of power, prestige and territorial security.
China has also increasingly been playing the role of a selective
supporter of regional and global institutions, and the norms and prin-
ciples embedded in them, to the extent that these contribute to China’s
rise as a full-fledged major power. Sinologists have noticed the evo-
lution of China during the 1980s as both a “system-exploiting great
power” and a “system-maintaining great power,” willing to join and
utilize international institutions to further its power goals. The change
36. The new national security doctrine published in January 2000 somewhat
reflects Russia’s deepened security concerns. For the first time since the end
of the Cold War, the national security doctrine openly described the West as
a “potential threat” to Russia’s security. Moreover, with its conventional and
military capabilities on the decline, the doctrine called for a nuclear first use
“in case of a threat to the existence of the Russian federation as a sovereign
state.” David Hoffman, “Russia Acts to Toughen its Security Framework,”
International Herald Tribune, January 15, 2000:1.
37. Ian Bremmer, “Russia’s Total Security,” World Policy Journal, 16(2), Summer
1999:2.
38. Bremmer, “Russia’s Total Security,” 31-39.
E 27
T.V. PAUL
in China’s position on international organizations coincided with “the
dramatic rise of China’s international standing in the hegemonic world
order and its sui generis status as a ‘poor global power’ can be explained
by the change in China’s national role conception from a revolutionary
system-transforming actor to a neo-realist system-maintaining status
quo actor.”39 Becoming a full-fledged global power remains a core
national objective of China. Chinese policy makers justify their goal of
great power status in order to “prevent the historical humiliations
suffered at the hands of Western and Japanese imperialism.”40
Although the People’s Liberation Arms (PLA) has reduced its size
since 1997, it is still aiming at a “lean, combined and highly efficient
army.” China’s military modernization is increasingly focusing on a
10-year plan to refurbish its nuclear forces, in order “to make them
more accurate, easier to launch and far less vulnerable to attack than
they are today. And it is hoping to use high technology to offset its
outmoded conventional forces.” What China seeks is an arsenal big
enough to deter but not so expensive as the Soviet forces that led to
Moscow’s economic bankruptcy.41
The Challenge from Regional Actors
Fundamental challenges to American hegemony are likely to come
from a small group of regional states and sub-national groups that
hold asymmetric capabilities, but possess strategies useful to pin down
a conventionally dominant power. These include guerilla warfare,
terrorism, and the possession, threat of use or actual use of weapons
of mass destruction. The US effort to stem the spread of nuclear, bio-
logical and chemical weapons has been motivated by these concerns.
This assessment is very much evident in the 1993 Bottom-up Review
and the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review by the Clinton administra-
tion. These reviews called for the US to be prepared to fight and win
39. Samuel S. Kim, “China’s International Organizational Behavior,” in Thomas
W. Robinson and David Shambaugh, eds., Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and
Practice, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994:401-34. See also Mel Gurttov and
Byong-Moo Hwang, China’s Security: The New Roles of the Military, Boul-
der, Lynne Rienner, 1998; Allen S. Whiting, “Chinese Nationalism and For-
eign Policy after Deng,” China Quarterly, 142, June 1995:295-316.
40. Paul H. Goodwin, “Force and Diplomacy: China Prepares for the Twenty-First
Century,” in Samuel S. Kim, ed., China and the World, 4th Edition, Boulder:
CO, Westview Press, 1998:171.
41. New York Times, March 15, 1999.
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two major regional conflicts simultaneously or in close succession in
two distant theaters. The US defense efforts since then have been
focussed on the regional threats more than anything else. This is
evident in the 1998 report to the President and the Congress by
Secretary of Defense William Cohen, which concluded that “the
foremost regional danger to the US security is the continuing threat
that hostile states with significant military power pose to allies and
friends in key regions. Between now and 2015, it is reasonable to
assume that more than one such aspiring regional power will have
both the motivation and the means to challenge US interests mili-
tarily.”42 Terrorist groups that find the US policies hostile, especially
in the Middle East, are likely to continue their assaults on US targets
in the region.
Soft Security Challenges
Although not as significant as hard challenges from other great powers
and regional actors, soft challenges do matter in the proper manage-
ment and extension of hegemony. Lesser allies are very much part of
the hegemon’s strength. When allies loosen their support level or
undertake countermeasures, including technological advancements,
the hegemonic state’s power is challenged in a soft way. The most
powerful soft challenges to US hegemony are likely to come from
European allies. Having witnessed their ineptitude in Bosnia and
Kosovo, they have resurrected the European Security and Defense
Identity (ESDI), a soft but symbolically powerful challenge to US
hegemony, especially because it threatens the very existence of NATO.
The US fears that this initiative may cause the death of NATO
altogether as it will have no American representation.43 The challenge
is also driven by the desire of the European states to maintain their
technological edge in aerospace and other cutting-edge areas of inno-
vation. The most significant change in this regard has been the increas-
ing integration of European defense industries unlike during the Cold
War period when “for reasons of promoting intra-NATO rationaliz-
42. Cited in Daniel Goure and Jeffrey M. Ranney, Averting the Defense Train Wreck
in the New Millennium, Washington D.C.: The CSIS Press, 1999:26-27.
43. The decoupling of America from the European security structure has been a
concern to American decision-makers. See for example, Madeline Albright,




ation, standardization, interoperability – have long pursued an expand-
ed transatlantic partnership when it comes to armaments cooperation.
In the past decade, however, intra-European weapons collaboration and
defense industry integration have expanded at a rate that far outstrips
transatlantic cooperation…. Western Europe increasingly views the
United States more as a competitor than a prospective partner when
it comes to arms production.”44
Allies and friends of the US, such as France, now increasingly speak
of a multipolar world. Some French policymakers view America is the
“hyper power,” or the power above the super power status, which needs
to be restrained.45 The security dimensions of all these are yet to perco-
late. The US, if loosened from its hold on NATO and Western Europe,
will increasingly focus on technological solutions to solve its security
problems. This could generate technological rivalries not just among the
US, Russia, and China, but between the US and Europe as well.
Loyalty Rarely Withers Away!
The view that the state’s security function will decline and therefore
states will lose the chief rationale for existence is at best premature.
As discussed previously, these arguments are based on several ill-
founded assumptions. They are: first, globalization will remove inter-
state conflicts and intra-state conflicts, thereby decreasing the role of
armed forces. Second, future technology will provide the hegemonic
power with overwhelming superiority in offensive, defensive and
deterrent capabilities that will make it irrational on the part of the
challenger to take on the hegemonic power. Third, geopolitical conflicts
are unlikely to occur in the future because Western, i.e. American,
military superiority is too high and no new nation is about to catch
up with the US. Fourth, ideology, nationalism, etc., will increasingly
become irrelevant as the benefits of globalization spread throughout
the world. Nations and individuals being rational will embrace the
virtues of globalization, or they will simply be constrained by the
mighty forces unleashed by globalization. Finally, state-society tensions
will increase in the absence of identifiable external threats as anti-
statist forces will gain an upper hand.
44. Richard A. Bitzinger, “Globalization in the Post-Cold War Defense Industry:
Challenges and Opportunities,” in Markusen and Costigan, eds. Arming the
Future, 321 and 325.
45. Hubert Verdine, Les Cartes de La France, Paris: Fayard, 2000:9.
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These assumptions are problematic. First, a challenger can design
asymmetric responses to counter the dominant state’s power position.
These include guerrilla warfare, terrorism, and options such as cyber-
war or technological shortcuts. Second, technology itself is a cause for
conflict because introduction of new technologies can often increase
the offensive power of states that gained early access to them. The
industrial revolution gave railroads, which enabled key European
states to organize mass movements of troops and launch popular
mobilization. The rise of the automobile, aircraft, and aircraft carriers
improved the offensive capabilities of states that acquired or mastered
these technological innovations early on. The nuclear revolution
increased the power of the deterrent and, to some extent, defense.
We still do not know how the information revolution is going to
affect warfare, whether it will result in advantage for the offense,
defense or deterrent. If it helps the offense, conflict behavior of the
beneficiaries of the information revolution is prone to increase.
Finally, geopolitical conflicts often arise as a result of an unintended
consequence of differential growth rates. A state that makes major
gains in economic and military capability may attempt to gain a
leadership role internationally. As the international system has no
peaceful mechanism to allow peaceful transitions, the likelihood of
conflict is very much present in the system.
All these elements point to the issue that loyalty is likely to stay
with the nation state. Differential growth rates imply that different
states provide benefits to the citizens in varying rates. In the example
of the US, loyalty is a function of the US hegemony, which is largely
the reason why Americans enjoy a higher standard of living compared
to citizens of other nations. The loyalty to the state is thus very much
intertwined with the individual’s own interests in seeing this
hegemony prolonged as long as possible. Any serious challenge to the
American hegemony is likely to spark the individual’s sense of
nationalism, often claimed to be decreasing at the altar of global forces.
With respect to state-society relations, it is often argued that, in
the absence of a grave external threat, the cohesiveness of the state
will decline, as anti-statist forces will emerge powerful. However, this
argument assumes that the state elite mismanages foreign policy as it
did in the 1960s, that democratic institutions are poorly designed to
incorporate change and that the civil society has weak roots. As
Friedberg argues, although the threat of war produced pressures to
build a powerful central state in the US, they were counterbalanced
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by “strong anti-statist influences that were deeply rooted in the
circumstances of the nation’s founding.” He adds: “The proper
balance between statist and anti-statist impulses can sometimes be
attained in the American system through convergence and coolly
reasoned compromise; more often it will be the product of heated
debate and intense, often bitter struggle.”46 My sense is that the end
of the Cold War has not yet produced a situation whereby anti-statist
forces have gained dominance, as the balance in terms of the role of
the state is visible in both the Republican and the Democratic parties.
The anti-statist forces within the Republican Party in fact are stronger
proponents of national defense, a contradiction of sorts.
Conclusions
Several conclusions emerge from this analysis. First, globalization has
not ended the core security functions of nation-states, even though
some states have scaled back on military spending. Second, globalization
is occurring in the backdrop of a near unipolarity in the structure of
the international system in which the hegemonic power, the US, is
the leader of the process. This structural condition has been strength-
ened by the increased role of US corporations, while these corpora-
tions themselves make use of the American power position to reinforce
their economic and political roles across the world. Third, the new
security threats have not made states redundant. The major innovation
of states has been the inclusion of the new security threats, such as
environment, disease etc., into national security calculations.
Fourth, state responses in the sphere of security have not been
uniform across cases or regions. Global social and economic forces
have affected states in varying degrees. The uneven responses in the
security arena in the face of these new global forces are due largely
to the varying contexts of states. Major powers have reduced the level
of conflict since the end of the Cold War, but security competition
exists in terms of political influence and weapons innovation.
Although several regional conflicts have subsided, traditional security
concerns still dominate the behavior of key regional states.
For the United States, the global hegemon, military power bestows
certain key functions. Its role as the extant global protector provides
it with a degree of social-structural power over allies and coercive
46. Aaron L. Friedberg, In the Shadow of the Garrison State, Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2000:3-4; 351.
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power over adversaries. The status a protector gains from anticipated
as well as undefined threats is thus a powerful source of control and
collaboration for the United States. In a more negative sense, it does
allow it to control the periphery—those states yet to be co-opted fully
in the hegemonic order—that could chip away at the dominant status
of the hegemonic power. The US is likely to remain a national
security state par excellence, although it may increasingly fashion
technological solutions to gaining dominance over allies and adversaries
and avoiding casualties in active military confrontations. The US
hegemony as a systemic condition guarantees adversarial responses from
subordinate actors most affected, even when the US elite devises
strategies to guarantee that the hegemonic power remains prepon-
derant over all other large and small challengers.
Revolutionary changes in military technology are a crucial factor
that will determine how states will provide security or respond to
security threats in the future. States tend to worry about technological
breakthroughs as the political, military and economic gains of such
changes may help transform the state or society that acquire the
cutting-edge technology disproportionately. Technology also partially
determines how a state organizes its resources for military security as
well as what strategies and doctrines it will adopt. The type of weapons
and technology dictated to a certain extent the adoption of strategies
such as the blitzkrieg and offensive doctrines before World War I and
II by European states.47 Thus, the relationship between technology
and military strategy is an enduring one and it will continue into the
future inter-state and intra-state relations.
Finally, states tend to adapt to changes in technology and socio-
political environments in varying degrees. States assume new orga-
nizational means to deal with challenges posed by external and
internal changes. Some states may innovate rapidly and may succeed
in providing security through means other than military/coercive
instruments. Military/coercive instruments are one of several
mechanisms states possess to provide security and therefore it is incorrect
to assert that states have lost their power in the security realm in the
era of globalization. Successful adaptation to new global social forces
is a sign of strength of the nation-state, not its weakness.
47. O’Hanlon, Technological Change and the Future of Warfare.
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